Why does the Gemara give outlandish explanations for Mishnayos? A possible explanation

I recently read an article which tried to explain the rationale for אוקימתות. The article explained as follows. If we take a look at laws of physics for example, Newton's first law. He points out that we can almost never see an application of it (an object in motion stays in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon by an unbalanced force) because in the real world there are always forces acting on objects like friction, gravity, etc. You need to set up special laboratory conditions to see it in action. In other worlds, many laws of physics only apply in specific laboratory conditions, e.g. an אוקימתא. With this the article makes the following claim. The Mishnayos are written to tell us theoretical principles in Halacha. The אוקימתות are there to create the laboratory conditions where these principles can be applied. The article then goes through a series of examples illustrating the point.

This is a fascinating explanation, however, I have a number of issues with it:

1. It is a very Brisker approach that both the Gemara and the Mishna are teaching us theoretical principles in Halacha. However, it is not at all clear that this is true.  The fact is that the Gemara doesn't tell us general principles rather, the Gemara discusses cases, it is very difficult to say that the case based method is actually teaching us theoretical principles. Additionally, the Brisker method came about in the 1800s, until then the mode of learning was very different and not focused at all on deriving theoretical principles from the Gemara. It is very hard to beloieve that the Brisker method, developed in the 1800s is the method that the Tannaim and Amoraim used in the Mishna and the Gemara. There is a fascinating article Legal Theology: The Turn to Conceptualism in Nineteenth-Century Jewish Law which details how the nineteenth century was the age of legal science. Across the globe, numerous cultures began to think of their law in terms of an interlocking system of internally coherent rules. The Brisker method needs to be understood in the context of what was going on in the world at the time.
2. It is not clear that this approach can explain all of the אוקימתות that the Gemara brings. In fact, the authors state that there are certainly exceptions. The question is how many exceptions? Even in the few examples given, the Rashba seems to understand the example not in consonance with their principle.